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JURISDICTION
This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code Annotated § 78-2a-3(2)(j).
GOVERNING LAW
The following statutory provisions are involved in the outcome of this appeal:
U.C.A. §§ 78-12-25(3); 78-12-26(3).
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A.

Course of Proceedings and Disposition Below.

In response to the Complaint, each of the defendants filed a motion to dismiss. (R.
29, 56, 51.) Carson's Motion to Dismiss included additional documents, including an
Agreement among Thomas, Russell and P.R.P., and a series of deeds from the lot closings
that are at the heart of the claim. (R.82, ^ 60-64, R.44-50, Addendum, pp. 15-22.) Russell
responded with a Memorandum (R.5 8) and an Amended Complaint (R.72), but did not file
any request to strike any of the additional documents contained in Carson's Motion to
Dismiss. (R.58-71.)
A hearing was had on the motions to dismiss on April 29, 2002, at which time the
court dismissed the Amended Complaint. (R.149.) During oral argument, plaintiffs'
counsel made the following comments:

1

. . . I want to be candid, because if the Court does not think
that I have what is, I think, common law variety fraud in the
classic sense, then I don't want to go any further.
As to the procedural context, I do believe that it has to be
considered most appropriately under the motion to dismiss
standards. There were attachments made to [Carson's
memorandum (R.40-50)]. There was a code section, there
was an agreement, and there was some warranty deeds.
They're irrelevant to my theory of the case. They're not in
affidavit form, but I don't think it matters.. ." (R.207 at p.
23.)
Plaintiffs' counsel did not ask for leave to file a second Amended Complaint.
Russell made an objection to the proposed Order of Dismissal, but did not raise any
issue with respect to the documents that were a part of Carson's motion to dismiss. (R.
155-158.) The objection was resolved pursuant to a Minute Entry dated June 10, 2002,
and the Order of Dismissal was signed that same date. (R. 191-194.)
B.

Statement of Facts

1.

Prior to November, 1996, when the Real Estate Purchase Contracts that are

the subject of the Amended Complaint were entered into, Russell and Thomas were
partners in a limited liability company, P.R.P. (R.72, ^ 5, 18.) Thomas was the manager
of P.R.P., and an agent of Russell. (R.73, <|[ 5.) Carson and Bustos were real estate agents
for Wardley Better Homes and Gardens. (R.74, *{ 10.)
2.

In the summer of 1996, Joel Carson showed John Thomas lots located at

Saratoga Springs that were available for development and sale. (R.76, ffl[26,29.) In fact,
P.R.P. did not make an offer to purchase the lots until after C.M.T., an entity which
2

Russell alleges was a sham, had contracted to purchase the lots for $25,000.00 per lot.
(R.77,ffi[33, 50.) After C.M.T. contracted to purchase the lots, it resold them pursuant
to a separate contract to P.R.P. on November 8, 1996 at a price of $30,000.00 per lot.
(R.79, A. Complaint,fflf44,45.)
3.

When Russell and Thomas separated in April, 1997, Russell agreed to pay

P.R.P. not $30,000.00 per lot, but $38,000.00 per lot. See Russell v. Thomas, 2000 Ut. Ct.
App. 82, at U 3. (Thomas retained all of the assets of P.R.P. other than the lots.) The first
lots were closed in July, 1997, with deeds being issued from Saratoga to C.M.T., and from
C.M.T. to Russell/Packard. (R.207, p. 39, and R.44, 46.)
4.

C.M.T. had no relationship to either Saratoga or P.R.P.

(Amended

Complaint, f 52.) There is no allegation in either complaint that the defendants Carson,
or Bustos ever misrepresented the (lack of) relationship between C.M.T. and Saratoga to
Russell. The alleged misrepresentation plead in ^ 65 of the Amended Complaint is as
follows: "Defendants represented to Saratoga that C.M.T. was part of, affiliated with,
or owned by plaintiffs." The first cause of action goes on to allege that because Saratoga
believed C.M.T. was affiliated with P.R.P., that "Saratoga sold the lots to C.M.T.." (A.
Complaint, R.72, ^67.)
5.

There is no allegation in the Amended Complaint that Bustos made any

misrepresentations to Russell. There is no allegation that Bustos acted as an agent for
either Russell or P.R.P., or that he owed any duty to them. (Cf. R.72 at \ 22.)

3

6.

Russell admitted in the Amended Complaint (R.81, f 58 and 59), that

plaintiffs were placed on inquiry notice in the spring of 2000 that C.M.T. was not under
the control of Saratoga Springs. (R.82 at ^ 58.) Russell also acknowledged, at page 11
(R.69) ofplaintiffs' Memorandum in Opposition to the Motions to Dismiss, that they were
placed on inquiry notice regarding the alleged fraud in the spring of 2000. During the
course of oral argument, plaintiffs' counsel further acknowledged that Russell had
discovered the alleged fraud in 2000 during "The final take down of the last 12 lots where
someone in Saratoga's organization is going through the paperwork . . .". (Page 32 of
Transcript, R. 207.)
7.

This action is one of three that have transpired out of the same transactions.

The other two cases, Wardley v. Carson, et.al., Civil No. 000904257 (filed May, 2000),
and Saratoga Springs Development v. Carson, et.al, Civil No. 000904607 (filed June,
2000, certified copy of Complaint is a part of the Addendum, p. 1), remain pending in the
Third District Court. Both of those cases were filed long before Russell filed this action
on November 30, 2001.
8.

Russell and the defendant John Thomas are not strangers to this Court. The

Agreement between them that was filed with Carson's Motion to Dismiss (R.40,
Addendum, p. 15) was before this Court in an appeal decided on March 23,2000, Russell
v. Thomas, 2000 Utah Ct. App. 82, 999 P.2d 1244. The facts in the earlier appeal were
not disputed (fn. l,999P.2dat 1245), and the holding in that case was that the April 1997
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contract between Russell and Thomas (the "Agreement"), which involved the same lots
at issue here, was not a conveyance of an interest in property, but merely a promise to do
so in the future. Id. at 1248, \ 14. During the course of oral argument on the motions to
dismiss, the Court placed Russell on notice that this Agreement would bear on the
standing issue. (Transcript, R.207 at p. 35.)
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
The District Court dismissed the plaintiffs' Complaint on the following basis: that
the plaintiffs had not brought their claims in a timely manner under the applicable statutes
of limitations; that the plaintiffs lacked standing; that the plaintiffs had failed to state a
claim for fraud; and that there was no civil action for commercial bribery. (R. 193,194.)
The four year statute of limitations, U.C.A. § 78-12-25(3), applies to all of the
plaintiffs9 claims, except for its fraud claim. This statute does not have an internal
discovery rule. Under Utah case law, where causes of action could have been discovered
by a reasonable plaintiff within the 4 years allowed by the statute of limitations, that
plaintiff is required to bring its action prior to the expiration of the statute of limitations.
In its complaints, the Russell plaintiffs (referred to collectively hereinafter simply as
Russell) admitted having been placed on constructive notice of the claims in the spring of
2000, prior to the expiration of the four year statute of limitations. Because Russell failed
to file its action before the 4 years expired, their claims for beach of fiduciary duty, civil

5

conspiracy, unjust enrichment, conversion, breach of principal agency relationship,
commercial bribery, and intentional interference are all barred by U.C.A. § 78-12-25(3).
Russells' fraud claim fails as a matter of law. Even though Russell filed an
Amended Complaint, that pleading did not assert the claim with the particularity required
by Rule 9. In addition, the facts are such that Russell could not plead an adequate claim
of fraud. Russell was not a party to the transactions. As a matter of kw, fraud claims are
not assignable. The balance of Russells' claims were addressed by a contract between
Russell and P.R.P., who was in fact the party to the transactions. That agreement did not
assign any claims to Russell. Russell lacks standing to assert the fraud claims. In
addition, Russells' fraud claims are barred by the statute of limitations in U.C.A. § 78-1226(3) as a matter of law. Russells' own chain of title revealed all of the information it
needed to know of the alleged fraud.
Utah does not recognize a civil claim for commercial bribery, and the trial court
was justified in dismissing that cause of action.

6

ARGUMENT
Appellees acknowledge that for purposes of motions to dismiss, trial courts must
accept the factual allegations in the [Amended] Complaint as true and that dismissal
should be affirmed only if it clearly appears that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in
support of their cause of action. Wright v. University of Utah, 876 P.2d 380 (Ut.App.
1994).
Plaintiffs' First Amended Complaint (R.72) asserts the following causes of action:
(i)

fraud;

(ii)

breach of fiduciary duty by Thomas and Carson;

(iii)

civil conspiracy to defraud;

(iv)

commercial bribery;

(v)

unjust enrichment;

(vi)

conversion and misappropriation of proprietary property;

(vii) breach of principal agency relation as to Carson and Thomas;
(viii) intentional interference with prospective economic relations.
I.

THE TRIAL COURT WAS JUSTIFIED IN DISMISSING
PLAINTIFFS5 CLAIMS BASED UPON THE STATUTES OF
LIMITATION,

A.

Plaintiffs' claims for breach of fiduciary duty, civil conspiracy, unjust

enrichment, conversion, breach of principal agency relationship, and intentional
interference are all barred by the four year statute of limitations.
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The parties agree that the four year statute of limitations, U.C.A. § 78-12-25(3),
applies to each of the foregoing claims. (Russell Brief, p. 11.) What the parties do not
agree on, however, is when this four year statute of limitations expired.
In Hill v. Alfred, 2001 UT 16, at % 15,28 P. 3d 1271, the Supreme Court observed
as follows:
Certain circumstances, however, raise the possibility that the
discovery rule may toll the limitations period "until the
discovery of facts forming the basis for the cause of action."
Id. The discovery rule is applicable when it is mandated by
statute, when a defendant has concealed a plaintiffs cause of
action, or when exceptional circumstances exist.1 (at 1275)
i.

U.C.A. § 78-12-25(3) does not mandate application of the discovery rule.

U.C.A. § 78-12-25(3) does not include what the Supreme Court has described as an
"internal" discovery rule. See Berenda v. Langford, 914 P.2d 45 at 55 (Utah 1996). This
is a significant distinction, because without the internal discovery rule, if Russell became
aware of their damage and possible causes of action before the four years allowed in
U.C.A. § 78-12-25(3) expired, they were obligated to bring their claims within those four
years. Atwood v. Sturm, Ruger & Co., 823 P.2d 1064 at 1065 (Utah 1992).
In the trial court, the defendants argued that even looking back to November, 1996,
that being the longest period possible and thus the most advantageous for Russell, that
Russells' admission (R.81, A. Complaint, Tf 58) that they had inquiry notice in the spring

1

In their memorandum before the trial court, Russell conceded that the "exceptional
circumstances", or third prong of the discovery rule does not apply in this case. (R.67, fn. 9.)
8

of 2000 required them to file these claims (breach of fiduciary duty, civil conspiracy,
unjust enrichment, conversion, breach of principal agency relationship, and intentional
interference) by November of 2000, four years from the alleged wrongdoing.
ii.

The "concealment'' exception does not apply in this case. In Warren v.

Provo City Corp., 838 P. 2d 1125 (Utah 1992), the Utah Supreme court observed as
follows:
The concealment version of the discovery rule is essentially
a claim of equitable estoppel...Therefore, in order to invoke
the concealment version of the discovery rule it must be
shown that given the defendants actions, a reasonable
plaintiff would not have brought suit within the statutory
period, (at 1130.)
Russell has not alleged that Carson or Bustos did anything to conceal the alleged
fraud after the spring of 2000. Indeed, as discussed hereinafter, the alleged fraud was
fully disclosed in Russells' own chain of title.
The following analysis was laid out in Hill v. Alfred, 2001 Ut. 16, ^ 17, 28 P.3d
1271 at 1276.
[Where] a plaintiff alleges that a defendant took affirmative
steps to conceal a plaintiffs cause of action... the plaintiff
can avoid the full operation of the discovery rule by making
a prima facie showing of fraudulent concealment and then
demonstrating that given the defendant's actions, a
reasonable plaintiff would not have discovered the claim
earlier.

9

In other words, under each of the first two exceptions created by the "discovery
rule/' if Russell, as a reasonable person, could have learned of facts in time to file the
action within the statutory period, the discovery rule will not extend the time for filing.
Russell has argued (p.13 of its Brief) that U.C.A. § 78-12-25(3) is "tolled" during
the period they claim to have been unaware of the claims. Tolling does not occur under
this statute.
It is apparent from this argument that Russell still does not accept the principle
enunciated by the Utah Supreme Court in Brigham Young University v. Paulsen
Construction, 744 P.2d 1370 at 1374 (Utah 1987), that "the Discovery Rule has no
application when an action could easily have been filed between the date of discovery and
the end of the limitation."
This rule was applied to U.C.A. § 78-12-25(3) in Atwood v. Sturm, Ruger & Co.,
823 P.2d 1064 (Utah 1992). In Atwood, the Supreme Court determined that where the
cause of action was discovered in the spring of 1998 and could have been filed before the
statute of limitations ran in October of 1988, that the discovery rule did not extend the
time for filing the action (at 1064). In short, there is no tolling under U.C.A. § 78-1225(3) if the facts giving rise to the claim were or reasonably could have been known prior
to the expiration of the four year statute.
iii.

Russell has admitted he knew of his claims within the statutory period, and

the trial court was not obligated to engage in fact finding to determine when Russell

10

should have discovered its claims. Russell has alleged that the "concealment" was a
failure to disclose to him (as opposed to P.R.P.) that C.M.T. was not owned or controlled
by Saratoga. (R.80, f 54.) In the trial court, Russell stated in his memorandum opposing
the Motion to Dismiss (R.64, If 13) that at the time of the last closing, an accountant for
Saratoga "discovered the C.M.T. transaction, alerted Saratoga's representatives, who in
turn alerted and placed on inquiry notice the sham transaction to plaintiffs, and the
successors in interest to the properties' right, title and interest and the claims for relief
asserted herein, in the spring 2000 time period...". (See R.81, ^ 55-59.) There are no
allegations that any time beyond the spring of 2000 was needed to discover facts or the
alleged causes of action, or that any alleged concealment continued beyond that date.
Russells' pleadings are, at a minimum, an admission that the defendants made no
misrepresentations to or concealed facts from them after the spring of 2000. Absent
misrepresentations, there can be no showing that defendants' actions prevented discovery
of the causes of action after the spring of 2000. Warren v. Provo City Corp., 838 P.2d
1125 (Utah 1992).
There was no argument advanced before the trial court, either in pleadings or at
oral argument, that (i) the plaintiffs needed to engage in a fact finding mission on the issue
of when they should have discovered additional facts, or (ii) that plaintiffs had not
discovered additional facts necessary for their claims until some later date. (R.207.)
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The plaintiffs have asserted for the first time in their Appellate Brief that even
though they knew of the alleged concealment in the spring of 2000, that "they did not
discover actual facts forming the basis for their causes of action until after the November
7, 2001 (2000?) deadline." (Appellants' Brief at p. 17.) Because this argument was not
advanced at the trial court, and was not a part of the allegations in the Amended
Complaint, as a matter of law, it should not be considered at this stage of the proceedings.
That this argument is first made at this late stage of the litigation is particularly
surprising in light of the following circumstances. On June 22, 2000, the plaintiff and
Saratoga Springs entered into a "Real Property Purchase Agreement" (R.40, Addendum
p. 23) which refers on page 4, subparagraph (e), to a civil action in the Third District
Court, 000904607CN (which is entitled Saratoga Springs Development v. Carson, et.al.,
see Statement of Facts, supra, ^7.) (A certified copy of the Complaint, as well as the
June, 2000 Agreement are in the Addendum, pp. 1 and 23.) That action names Carson and
Bustos, among others, as defendants.

The June, 2000 Agreement was signed by

Russell/Packard, the plaintiff in this action. Larry Russell testified under oath in his
deposition in the Saratoga action that the Agreement was prepared by Michael Carlston,
one of his attorneys in this action. (Russell deposition, p. 40, dated October 30, 2001,
Addendum, p. 38.) While the Saratoga Complaint and Larry Russell's deposition pages
were not filed in the trial court, they would have been filed had Russell argued there that
they needed time beyond the statute of limitations to discover additional facts.

12

The allegations made in this action by Russell are virtually identical to those made
in June, 2000 by Saratoga. Plaintiffs9 counsel in this appeal has an affirmative obligation
to know whether or not the allegations and factual contentions that they now make for the
first time on appeal have any evidentiary support. Obviously, they do not. In fact, the
June, 2000 Agreement goes on and provides for a division of the spoils if Saratoga
prevails in its action against these defendants, and states in paragraph 7.10 that Saratoga
and Russell/Packard "will attempt to consolidate into one action any legal claims they may
bring against C.M.T. or others...". In other words, Russell knew not later than June 22,
2000 of all of the allegations and claims now being asserted against Bustos, Carson and
Thomas in this action. Thus, it clearly appears that Russell has not alleged and can cannot
prove any set of facts which warrants an extension of U.C.A. § 78-12-25(3) beyond
November of 2000. See Wright v. University of Utah, supra.
Russells' argument is further undermined by the fact that by the spring of 2000, all
Russell had to do was check its own chain of title or speak to the accountant who gave it
information (R.81, ^ 55) and they would have learned that Saratoga was deeding
properties to C.M.T., who in turn was deeding them to Russell/Packard. Russell could
have made additional inquiries of Saratoga in the spring of 2000, as they acknowledged
doing in paragraph 60 of the Amended Complaint (R. 72). In short, the only reason it may
have taken Russell Packard the sixteen plus months beyond the spring of 2000 that it now

13

argues was needed to discover the additional facts it claims on appeal were necessary to
initiate this action was their own lack of diligence.
The case of Hill v. Allred, 2001 UT 16,28 P.3d 1271 is not helpful to Russell. In
Hilly the plaintiff set forth a litany of heroic efforts taken to discover facts actively
concealed from her which were essential to her claims. In this action, Russell has alleged
and acknowledged they learned of the essential facts many months before the statute of
limitations had expired. Moreover, these additional "facts" were always a matter ofpublic
record in their own chain of title.
The argument that more time was needed also fails under the reasoning of the Utah
Supreme Court in Warren v. Provo City Corp., 838 P.2d 1125 (Utah 1992). In that case,
the Court held that if there were no representations by the defendant, there could be no
showing that the defendant's actions prevented the discovery of the cause of action, (at
1130.) In this case, Russell has conceded that defendants' alleged concealment ended in
the spring of 2000. (R.81, ^f 59.) Under the rule applied in the Warren case, after the
spring of 2000 there can be no showing that defendants' actions prevented the discovery
of the claims that were filed in November, 2001.
For all of these reasons, the plaintiffs' claims for breach of fiduciary duty, civil
conspiracy, unjust enrichment, conversion, breach of principal agency relationship, and
intentional interference are barred by U.C.A. § 78-12-25(3). The trial court's dismissal
of these claims should be affirmed as to all defendants.
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II.

RUSSELLS' FRAUD CLAIM FAILS AS A MATTER OF LAW.

A.

Russells' fraud allegations do not state a claim for relief.

Plaintiffs have not alleged that Carson or Bustos made any misrepresentation to
them. For example, in paragraph 31 of the Amended Complaint (R.77), Russell alleges
that"... Carson, Thomas and Bustos continued to develop the scheme by continuing to
make overt acts and representations to Saratoga...".

Other allegations of

misrepresentations ostensibly made to Saratoga are contained in the Amended Complaint,
R. 72, at K 35 and 65.
Russell argues, without reference to any legal authority, that a misrepresentation
ostensibly made to Saratoga triggers a right to relief in him if the purpose of the conduct
was to induce him to act. (Brief, p. 22-23.) It is impossible to address the authority for
this assertion when none is offered by Russell. The assertion is contrary to settled case
authority. See, for example, Blodgett v. Martsch, 590 P.2d 298,301 (Utah 1978) (plaintiff
must "prove the defendant knowingly misrepresented a material fact with intent to induce
the plaintiff to act or refrain from action"); King v. Nevada Elec. Inv. Co., 893 F. Supp.
1006,1012 (D. Utah 1993) (without proof of any affirmative, material misrepresentation
by defendant to plaintiff, no fraud claim will lie). The allegations that Saratoga, not
Russell, was induced to act does not support a fraud claim for Russell. (R.82, f 67, 68.)
Another essential factor that Russell must hope this Court will ignore is that they
were not a party to any of the November, 1996 transactions. Russell concedes, as they
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must, that John Thomas was their agent and the manager of P.R.P., a Utah limited liability
company. Russell was, at best, a member of an LLC. P.R.P. was the party to the
November 1996 transactions. There is no allegation that P.R.P. was defrauded.
Other potential allegations of misrepresentation directed to Carson or Bustos
concede that they were made "through P.R.P." (See for example, A. Complaint, R. 72,
<|fl[ 25,47.) Absent an allegation that Carson or Bustos made misrepresentations to Russell
or Russell/Packard, no claim lies in favor of plaintiffs and against Bustos or Carson for
fraud. See Pace v. Parish, 247 P.2d at 275 (Ut. 1952).
Russells' fraud claim against Carson and Bustos does not pass Rule 9, U. R. Civ.
P. scrutiny. Under Rule 9, claims of fraud must be made with particularity. See Brown
v. Wanless, 2001 UT App. 30, 18 P. 3d 1137. For example, there is no allegation that
Russell was aware of the alleged misrepresentations made by Carson or Bustos to
Saratoga at any time in 1996 or 1997. There is no allegation that any misrepresentation
was made by Carson or Bustos to Russell. There is no allegation that Russell was induced
to act by any alleged misrepresentation of Bustos or Carson. Even if such an allegation
had been made, the fact that Thomas was the manager and agent for P.R.P. making
decisions regarding the transaction undermines any contention that Russells' knowledge
would have been of any legal significance.
Russell has alleged that Thomas was, "at all material times a manager of an entity
known as P.R.P., and an agent and a fiduciary of plaintiffs." (R. 73, ^f 5.) Thus, as a
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matter of law, both Russell and P.R.P. were charged with the knowledge that Thomas had,
which included the knowledge that C.M.T. and Saratoga were not the same entities (R. 78,
U 37,38) and that the sales price of the lotsfromSaratoga to C.M.T. was $25,000.00. In
a recent decision, Wardley v. Cannon, 2002 UT 99, ^ 16 to 19, the Utah Supreme Court
discussed the imputation of knowledge from a realtor (agent) to his principal broker
(principal). It observed that "[a] principal is affected with constructive knowledge,
regardless of actual knowledge, of all material facts of which its agent receives
notice...while acting in the course of his employment and within the scope of his authority,
although the agent does not inform his principal thereof." (At ^ 16.) Imputation applies
in tort and contract actions. Wardley at ^ 19. Applied to this case, so far as Carson and
Bustos are concerned Russell is charged with whatever Thomas knew in the course of his
duties as the manager of P.R.P.
For these reasons, i) the absence of any allegation of a misrepresentation from
Bustos or Carson to Russell, ii) the failure to meet the requirements of Rule 9, and iii)
Russells' imputed knowledge, Russell has not and cannot state a cause of action in fraud
against Bustos or Carson.
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B.

Russell lacks standing to assert fraud claims against Carson and Bustos.

While the lack of standing argument would apply to the full range of Russells'
claims, its discussion here is focused on the issue of Russells' fraud claim against Bustos
and Carson.2
In their initial complaint, Russell did not allege any facts which would have given
them the right to pursue P.R.P.'s claims in their own name. In their Amended Complaint
(R. 74, f 8), in apparent response to this argument, Russell alleged that the "right, title,
and interest to this litigation..." was assigned to them. Russell thus concedes that the
claims they are asserting were assigned to them by P.R.P.
Russell is not in a position to pursue assigned claims against Carson and Bustos
because P.R.P., as a matter of law, did not have a fraud claim against Carson or Bustos.
Because Thomas was alleged to be a part of all of the circumstances giving rise
to the claims, P.R.P. itself has no fraud claims against Carson or Bustos. Even if claims
did exist in favor of P.R.P., all of P.RJP.'s purported fraud claims are cut off by the statute
of limitations because of the knowledge of its agent and manager, Thomas, in 1996 that
CMT was not the same as either P.R.P. or Saratoga. See Horrocks v. Westfalia Systemat,
892 P. 2d 14 (Ut. App. 1995).

2

Carson and Bustos join in the argument set forth in Thomas' brief on the standing issue,
but do not repeat it in this brief.
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Another circumstance undermines Russells' standing. Russell alleges that he was
a 50 percent owner of P.R.P., that P.R.P. was a Utah limited liability company, and that
P.R.P. has since been dissolved. (R. 74, A. Complaint, ^[8.) P.R.P. expired on April 23,
2001,60 days after its delinquency date, which was February 22,2001. (R.48.) Because
P.R.P. expired before the new L.L.C. statute became effective, the old L.L.C. statute
applies. (U.C.A. § 48-2c-101, et. seq., effective July 1,2001.) By the end of April, 2001
when P.R.P. expired, P.R.P. was barred by law from bringing its own suit. (See U.C.A.
§ 48-2b-142(9), (repealed).) In other words, if Russell has an "assigned" claim, as he
alleges, it died when P.R.P. expired.
Finally, this Court can determine, as a matter of law, that Russell did not acquire
any fraud claim from P.R.P. by virtue of the April 1997 Agreement. From the plain
language of the April 1997 Agreement (R. 40), which has already been before this Court
for consideration in a separate matter, Russell Russell/Packard Development, Saratoga
Springs Development, etalv. John Thomas andP.R. Development, 2000 Ut. Ct. App. 82,
999 P.2d 1244, it is clear that Russell was acquiring the Saratoga lots, and nothing more.
(R. 40: "Whereas, Russell is willing to pay P.R.P. to acquire the Property.... P.R.P. agrees
to assign to Russell all of its right, title and interest in the Contract and its right to acquire
the Saratoga Property at the time of closing.") In the same Agreement fl[ 3), Russell
disclaimed any further interest in P.R.P.
Fraud is not a contract claim. Fraud is not the Saratoga Property.
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In short, if there was a fraud claim arising out of the transaction, it stayed with and
died with P.R.P., and was not transferred to Russell.
C.

Even if a fraud claim were stated which Russell has standing to assert, it is

time barred.
At the trial court, the defendants argued, based on the deeds dated July 3, 1997
(Addendum, pp. 15-18) from the first closing under the November contract between
C.M.T. and P.R.P., and U.C.A. § 57-3-102 (recorded documents impart notice to all
persons of their contents from the time of recording) that the fraud statute of limitations
began to run in July, 1997 when those first deeds were recorded. This Court recently
recognized the constructive notice created by a properly recorded document. .See
Johannessen v. Canyon Road Towers Owners Assoc, 2002 UT App 332, ^| 23, 24. As a
result of the constructive knowledge arising out of the recorded deeds from Saratoga to
C.M.T. and then from C.M.T. to Russell/Packard, the statute of limitations on Russells'
claim that they were defrauded by the failure of Carson or Bustos to disclose the separate
existence of Saratoga and C.M.T. began to run in July of 1997 and expired not later than
July 2000, approximately 16 months before the complaint was filed.
Russells9 argument assumes that his loss was triggered by the execution of the
November, 1996 agreement. Russell was not a party to the November, 1996 contract. No
land exchanged hands in November, 1996. In fact, as was discussed at the trial court and
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not disputed, the first closing of any sale under the real estate purchase contracts occurred
in July, 1997. (R.44-47.)
Russell acknowledged in the trial court in his memorandum, (R. 68) that "the entire
scheme required concealment of the sham middle man, C.M.T., and it's non-affiliation
with either the true seller or the true buyer." Yet, Russell ignores the indisputable fact that
C.M.T.'s existence and role in the transaction is reflected in each deed which he received
for each of the lots he purchased. The two deeds (R. 44-47) used to complete each
transaction, the first from Saratoga Springs to C.M.T. and the second from C.M.T. to
P.R.P., as a matter of law constitute notice of the separateness of C.M.T. and Saratoga
Springs Development.

U.C.A. § 57-3-102. This factor alone placed Russell on

constructive notice not later than July, 1997, of the separateness of C.M.T. and Saratoga
and defeats Russells' claim that the discovery rule extends the statute of limitations on his
fraud claim.
The discovery rule relied upon by Russell to extend the statute of limitations does
not contemplate or require actual knowledge of the alleged fraud. In Baldwin v. Burton,
850 P.2d 1188 (Utah 1993), the Utah Supreme Court discussed the discovery rule under
§78-12-26(3) as follows:
The words 'until the discovery [of fraud]' are generally
interpreted as meaning from the time the fraud was actually
known or could have been discovered through the exercise
of reasonable diligence. Specifically addressing § 78-1226(3), this Court stated that the three year statute of
limitations for fraud 'begins to run from the time the person
21

entitled to the property knows, or by reasonable diligence and
inquiry should know, the relevant facts and 'of the fraud
perpetrated against him. Furthermore, we have previously
observed: 'The means of knowledge is equivalent to
knowledge. A party who has opportunity of knowing the
facts constituting the alleged fraud cannot be inactive and
afterwards allege a want of knowledge that arose by reason
of his own laches and negligence.' (Emphasis added.)
In the Baldwin case, the Burtons were attempting to execute on a judgment lien and the
question was whether or not a prior (allegedlyfraudulent)transfer of property should have
been discovered by Burton's in their effort to levy on a judgment. The allegedly
fraudulent transfer had been recorded at the time Burton's judgment was entered. The
Supreme Court observed that Burton should have searched property records for property
upon which to levy when his judgment was entered, and the Court concluded that the
transfer should have been discovered when Burton obtained his judgment.
Had a search been made, exercising reasonable diligence and
proper prudence, [Burton] surely would have uncovered the
transfer from Wood to his wife. Discovery of the transfer
would then have sparked further inquiry on the part of
Burton. If such inquiry had been pursued, the Burton's
would have discovered facts surrounding the alleged
fraudulent conveyance. At the very least, discovery of the
transfer should have incited suspicion of fraud. . .
However, it is not necessary for a claimant to know every
fact about his fraud claim before the statute begins to run.
The means of knowledge were available to the Burtons, and
upon obtaining the judgment against Willard Wood, they
should have discovered facts surrounding the alleged fraud.
(Emphasis added.)
850P.2datll97.
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U.C.A. § 57-3-102 provides that the recording of instruments imparts notice to all
persons of their contents. The deeds (R. 44-47) reflect that at the time of the initial
transfer of property to Russell, the Saratoga Springs deed to C.M.T. Development, Inc.
was recorded, and revealed the separate transaction from Saratoga to C.M.T. As a matter
of law, Russell is held to know of the existence of the two separate closings and all of the
information that he could have obtained in connection therewith.
The case of Hill v. Alfred, 2001 UT 16,28 P.3d 1271 upon which Russell relies is
inapposite to the facts on fraud statute of limitations as well. In Hill, it appears that the
defendants actively concealed or mispresented critical facts to the plaintiff that created her
causes of action against them. The claims did not involve recorded documents. In this
case, concealment was not possible because the existence and separateness of C.M.T.
from Saratoga was clearly revealed in the chain of title to the very lots Russell acquired.
U.C.A. § 57-3-102 mandates that Russell had notice of the prior recorded deed from
Saratoga Springs Development to C.M.T., and as discussed in the Baldwin, case, supra,
that notice included all of the information that would have been acquired through
reasonable diligence and inquiry regarding that deed. In fact, Russells' brief on appeal
concedes that the knowledge of the alleged fraud came from sources available to it. That
inquiry would have revealed the two-step transaction and given Russell all the information
they claim was needed.
Russell was, as a matter of law, aware of the separateness of Saratoga and C.M.T.
not later than July, 1997 when the first closing occurred. Thus, the three year statute of
23

limitations expired in July 2000. This action was not filed until November of 2001, nearly
one and one-half years after the statute of limitations had expired.
III.

PLAINTIFF'S COMMERCIAL BRIBERY CLAIM FAILS AS
A MATTER OF LAW,

Russell has asserted a claim of commercial bribery against all defendants. This
issue has been briefed by Thomas, and Carson and Bustos join in that argument.
IV.

RUSSELL HAS NOT STATED ANY CLAIM FOR
RELIEF AGAINST BUSTOS.

Plaintiffs claims against Bustos are even more remote than those asserted against
Carson and Thomas, and in addition to the foregoing reasons, fail for the following
additional reasons.
Plaintiffs' first cause of action against Bustos alleges fraud based on
misrepresentations ostensibly made to Saratoga. There is no allegation that Bustos ever
communicated with plaintiffs while the transactions were occurring. In other words, there
was no representation made by Bustos to plaintiffs.

Bustos is not identified as a

defendant in either the second cause of action (breach of a fiduciary duty) or the seventh
cause of action (breach of principal agency relationship). This is an acknowledgment by
the plaintiffs that Bustos owed them no fiduciary duty.
The balance of the claims against Bustos are barred for all of the reasons discussed
above.
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CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the decision of the trial court dismissing the Amended
Complaint should be affirmed.
DATED this

W

day of February, 2003.

Keith W. Meade
COHNE, RAPPAPORT & SEGAL
Attorney for Joel Carson

i. Adamson
DAOT, ADAMSON & DONOVAN
Attorney for William Bustos
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, IN AND FOR
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
SARATOGA SPRINGS DEVELOPMENT,
LLC

COMPLAINT

Plaintiff,
vs.
JOEL M. CARSON, an individual;
CHARLES PEREZ, an individual;
WILLIAM BUSTOS, an individual; POE
INVESTMENT COMPANY, LLC, a
limited liability company; CHARLES
PEREZ, dba CMT, INC.; CMT, INC.,
currently a California Corporation; NEXUS
INVESTMENTS, L.L.C., a Utah limited
liability company; ARISTOTLE
INVESTMENTS, INC., P.C, a Utah
corporation; BUSTOS ENTERPRISES,
LTD., a limited partnership; WILLIAM A.
BUSTOS FAMILY TRUST; CORAZON
M. TORRES, an individual; MARTIN
DELGADO, an individual; and JOHN
DOES 1 to 10,

Civil No.
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Defendants.
Plaintiff Saratoga Springs Development, LLC, (SSD), by and through counsel
hereby complains, alleges and contends against Defendants Joel M. Carson ("Carson"), an

individual; Charles Perez ("Perez"), an individual, William Bustos ("Bustos"), an individual;
Poe Investment Company, LLC, ("Poe") formerly a limited liability company; CMT, Inc.
("CMT"), currently a California corporation; Nexus Investments, L.L.C. ("Nexus"), currently a
Utah limited liability company; Aristotle Investments, Inc. P.C. ("Aristotle"), currently a Utah
corporation; Bustos Enterprises, LTD. ("Bustos Enterprises"), currently a Utah limited
partnership; the William A. Bustos Family Trust ("Bustos Trust"); Corazon M. Torres ("Torres"),
an individual; Martin Delgado ("Delgado"), an individual; and JOHN DOES 1 to 10, as follows:
JURISDICTION AND VENUE
1.

This court has jurisdiction over this action pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-3-4.

2.

Venue of this action is proper in this court pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-13-4.
PARTIES

3.

SSD is a Utah Limited Liability Company in good standing licensed to do business in the
State of Utah.

4.

Carson is an individual residing in Salt Lake County, Utah.

5.

Perez is an individual who at one time resided in Salt Lake County, Utah, and who
entered a contract in the name of CMT, in Salt Lake County, Utah, for the sale of real
property in this State. CMT does not exist pursuant to the laws of Utah and is NOT
legally authorized to do business or enter contracts within this State as a domestic or
foreign corporation or other legal entity.

6.

Bustos is an individual residing within Salt Lake County, State of Utah, and is a principal
in Nexus, Aristotle, Bustos Enterprises and the Bustos Trust. He also was a member of
Poe, when it was in existence.

Poe was formerly a limited liability company organized within the State of Utah on or
about July 19, 1996, but was involuntarily dissolved on or about August 22, 1997. When
Poe was formed Carson and Bustos were its members.
CMT, Inc. is currently a California corporation in good standing that was not organized
at the time of the events, facts and circumstances giving rise to the claims asserted
herein. Since that time, however, CMT, Inc. has been organized pursuant to the laws
of the State of California, but to date has not been authorized to do business as a
foreign corporation within the State of Utah.
Nexus has been a limited liability company authorized to do business in the State of
Utah since January 14, 1997. Nexus, however, was not organized in or recognized by
the State of Utah as a legal entity at the time of the events, facts and circumstances
giving rise to the claims asserted herein. Nexus' members are Aristotle and Bustos
Enterprises.
Aristotle has been a Utah corporation in good standing which has been authorized to do
business in the State of Utah since January 7, 1993. Bustos is Aristotle's President and
only Director currently on record with the State of Utah.
Bustos Enterprises is a limited partnership in good standing that has been organized
pursuant to the laws of Utah since December 31, 1996. Its members are William
Bustos, Trustee and the William A. Bustos Family Trust. Bustos Enterprises, however,
was not recognized by the State of Utah as a legal entity at the time of the events, facts
and circumstances giving rise to the claims asserted herein.
Torres is an individual who currently resides in the State of California and is a principal
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in and director of CMT. He, individually, with the other Defendants, and or in the
name of CMT, entered into a contract in the State of Utah to purchase and sell real
property located in Utah County, State of Utah.
13.

Delgado is an individual who currently resides in the State of California and is a
principal in and director of CMT. He, individually, and or in the name of CMT
entered into a contract in the State of Utah to purchase and sell real property located in
Utah County, State of Utah.

14.

John Does one through ten are as of yet unknown individuals and other legal and/or
illegal entities that individually or through authorized agents engaged in, conspired to
commit or facilitated in the commission of the wrongs alleged herein.
FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS

15.

At all times relevant to the facts and circumstances alleged in this Complaint, Carson was
a real estate agent licensed by the State of Utah to conduct real estate activities in Utah.

16.

In January of 1996, SSD owned 72 building lots located in Saratoga Springs, Lehi City,
Utah County ("the Property").

17.

In the summer of 1996, SSD retained Wardley Corporation dba Wardley Better Homes
and Gardens Real Estate ("Wardley") to help market the Property.

18.

In the summer and fall of 1996 SSD negotiated with PRP Development, L.C., ("PRP") a
Utah Limited Liability Company over the sale of the Property. In those negotiations SSD
was represented by Dan Cary ("Cary") and PRP was represented by Carson.

19.

Carson owed PRP duties of loyalty, honesty, faithfulness and full disclosure.

20.

Carson owed SSD duties of honesty and full disclosure.

A

21.

On or about October 11, 1996, Carson filled out and presented SSD with a Real Estate
Purchase Contract for the Property which identified CMT as the buyer and offered to
purchase the Property from SSD for $25,000 per building lot for a total of $1,800,000
("the CMT offer").

22.

Defendants, personally or through agents, told Cary and principals of SSD that CMT was
affiliated with and a part of PRP.

23.

At all times SSD was advised and believed that CMT was affiliated with and was a part
ofPRP.

24.

At the time SSD was considering the CMT offer, SSD had offers from other parties who
wanted to purchase the Property.

25.

CMT in fact was not affiliated with nor a part of PRP and Defendants' representations to
that effect were false.

26.

At the time CMT?s offer was presented to SSD, CMT was not incorporated or organized
pursuant to the laws of Utah and was not authorized to do business in Utah as a foreign
corporation.

27.

At no time since CMTfs offer was presented to SSD has CMT been incorporated or
organized pursuant to the laws of Utah or been authorized to do business in Utah as a
foreign corporation.

28.

In reality, CMT was made up of one, all, or some group of Defendants who collectively
defrauded SSD in the above manner.

29.

CMT's true identity was a fact that was material to SSDfs consideration of CMT's offer.

30.

Based upon Defendants' misrepresentations and SSD's reasonable understanding and

belief about CMTfs identity, affiliation and association with PRP, SSD continued to
negotiate with CMT and on November 4, 1996, agreed to enter into a Real Estate
Purchase Contract with CMT for the purchase of the Property ("the SSD/CMT
Contract").
31.

The SSD/CMT Contract provided, in part, that CMT would pay SSD $ 1,800,000 for the
Property.

32.

The SSD/CMT Contract has been partially performed.

33.

The lack of CMTfs corporate status makes the unperformed portions of the SSD/CMT
Contract voidable.

34.

Defendants1 fraudulent misrepresentations regarding CMT's true identity and affiliations
makes the unperformed portions of the SSD/CMT Contract voidable.

35.

SSD wishes to void all unperformed portions of the SSD/CMT Contract.

36.

If Defendants had not fraudulently misrepresented the true identity of CMT to SSD, SSD
would not have agreed to sell the Property for $1,800,000, but would have demanded that
the price for the property be increased to at least $2,160,000 or $30,000 per lot.

37.

If Defendants had not improperly interjected CMT into the negotiations between SSD
and PRP, SSD would have sold the Property to PRP for $2,160,000 or $30,000 per lot.

38.

If Defendants had not improperly interjected CMT into the negotiations between SSD
and PRP, PRP would have purchased the Property from PRP for $2,160,000 or $30,000
per lot.

39.

Upon information and belief Defendants told PRP that CMT was affiliated with and a
part of SSD.

40.

Upon information and belief, PRP and its principals were advised and believed that CMT
was affiliated with and a part of SSD.

41.

Upon information and belief, Defendants knew when the CMT offer was presented to
SSD that SSD had offers from other parties who wanted to purchase the Property.

42.

CMT in fact was not affiliated with nor a part of SSD and Defendants' representations to
that effect were false.

43.

Upon information and belief CMT's true identity was a fact that was material to PRP's
consideration of CMT's offer.

44.

Upon information and belief, PRP continued to negotiate with CMT for the purchase of
the Property because of Defendants' misrepresentations about CMT's true identity,
affiliation and association with SSD and on November 5, 1996, PRP agreed to enter into
a Real Estate Purchase Contract with CMT for the Property ("the CMT/PRP Contract").

45.

The CMT/PRP Contract provided that PRP would pay CMT $2,160,000 for the Property.

46.

The CMT/PRP Contract has been partially performed.

47.

The lack of CMT's corporate status makes the unperformed portions of the CMT/PRP
Contract voidable.

48.

Carson's, Perez's and CMT's fraudulent representations regarding CMT's true identity and
affiliations makes the unperformed portions of the CMT/PRP Contract voidable.

49.

Upon information and belief, PRP wishes to void all unperformed portions of the
CMT/PRP Contract.

50.

Defendants were negotiating to purchase the Property from SSD at the same time they
were negotiating to sell the Property to PRP.

51.

Defendants fraudulently misrepresented the true identity and affiliations of CMT in order
to mislead SSD and PRP and to benefit themselves at the expense of SSD and PRP.

52.

As a real estate agent licensed with the State of Utah, Carson was legally and ethically
prohibited from fraudulently misrepresenting the true character, identity and affiliations
of CMT to either SSD or PRP.

53.

As a real estate agent licensed with the State of Utah, Carson was legally and ethically
prohibited interjecting himself or others into the negotiations between SSD and PRP,
thereby usurping SSD's and PRP's opportunities for himself and/or others.

54.

Defendants interjected themselves into the ongoing negotiations of SSD and PRi* to
benefit themselves at the expense of SSD and PRP.
FIRST CLAIM FOR RELIEF
(Fraud)

55.

Paragraphs 1 through 54 are hereby incorporated by reference as though fully set forth
herein.

56.

Defendants affirmatively represented to SSD that CMT was affiliated with and a part of
PRP while negotiating to purchase the Property from SSD.

57.

The true identity, character, affiliation and nature of CMT were material facts which SSD
relied upon when it continued to negotiate with and agreed to enter a contract with CMT
for the sale/purchase of the Property.

58.

CMT was not affiliated with or a part of PRP.

59.

Defendants knew CMT was not a part of or affiliated with PRP.

60.

Defendants intended for SSD to rely upon their misrepresentation of the nature, character,
identity and affiliation of CMT so that SSD would sell the Property to CMT rather than to

PRP.
61.

SSD reasonably relied upon Defendants' misrepresentations regarding CMT, and did not
know those representations were false when it negotiated with and agreed to enter a
contract with CMT.

62.

SSD suffered losses of at least $360,000 as a result of Defendants' fraudulent
misrepresentations.
SECOND CLAIM FOR RELIEF
(Civil Conspiracy)

63.

Paragraphs 1 through 50 are hereby incorporated by reference as though fully set forth
herein.

64.

Defendants conspired and agreed to act and conduct themselves in a manner so as to
prevent SSD from learning of the true nature of CMT and thereby prevented SSD from
selling the Property to PRP for $2,160,000.

65.

One or more of the Defendants' conduct was unlawful.

66.

SSD suffered losses of at least $360,000 as a direct and proximate result of Defendants'
civil conspiracy to defraud SSD and obtain an interest in the Property by deceit and false
pretense.

67.

Defendants are obligated to reimburse SSD for the profits it would have made if they had
not conspired to defraud SSD.
THIRD CLAIM FOR RELIEF
(Commercial Bribery)

68.

Paragraphs 1 through 67 are hereby incorporated by reference as though fully set forth
herein.

69.

Utah Code Anno § 76-6-508 prohibits anyone from conferring or offering an employee,
agent or fiduciary a benefit to influence the employee's, agent's or fiduciary's conduct
relating to his employer's or principal's affairs without the consent of the employer or
principal and contrary to the interests of the employer or principal.

70.

Upon information and belief, one or more of the Defendants offered or conferred a
benefit upon Carson without the knowledge or consent of PRP or Wardley (Carson's Real
Estate Broker) to the detriment of both PRP and Wardley.

71.

As a direct and proximate result of Defendants' illegal inducement or confirmation of a
benefit upon Carson, SSD suffered losses of at least $360,000.

72.

Those Defendants are obligated to reimburse SSD for the profits it would have earned if
they had not committed commercial bribery of Carson.
FOURTH CLAIM FOR RELIEF
(Commercial Bribery—Carson)

73.

Paragraphs 1 through 72 are hereby incorporated by reference as though fully set forth
herein.

74.

Utah Code Anno § 76-6-508 prohibits an employee, agent, or fiduciary of an employer or
principal, from soliciting, accepting, or agreeing to accept any benefit from another upon
an agreement or understanding that such benefit will influence his conduct in relation to
his employer's or principal's affairs, without the knowledge and consent of the employer
or principal and contrary to the interests of the employer or principal.

75.

Upon information and belief, Carson solicited, accepted or agreed to accept a benefit
from one or more of the Defendants in order to influence his conduct in relation to his
employer's and principal's affairs, without the knowledge or consent of PRP or Wardley
1n

(Carson's Real Estate Broker) to the detriment of both PRP and Wardley.
76.

As a direct and proximate result of Carson's solicitation, acceptance or agreement to
accept an illegal inducement, SSD suffered losses of at least $360,000.

77.

Carson is obligated to reimburse SSD for the profits it would have earned if Carson had
not committed commercial bribery.
FIFTH CLAIM FOR RELIEF
(Interference with Contract)

78.

Paragraphs 1 through 77 are hereby incorporated by reference as though fully set forth
herein.

79.

SSD and PRP were involved in negotiations that would have culminated in a contract
whereby SSD would have sold the Property to PRP for $2,160,000.

80.

Defendants interjected themselves into those contractual negotiations in order to enrich
themselves at the expense of SSD,

81.

As a result of Defendants' interference with SSD's prospective economic relations with
PRP, SSD did not enter into a contract with PRP to sell it the Property for $2,160,000.

82.

As a direct and proximate result of Defendants' interference with SSD's prospective
economic relations with PRP, SSD lost $360,000.
SIXTH CLAIM FOR RELIEF
(Unjust Enrichment)

83.

Paragraphs 1 through 82 are hereby incorporated by reference as though fully set forth
herein.

84.

Defendants benefitted as a result of their fraud, civil conspiracy, commercial bribery and
interference with SSD's prospective economic relations.
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85.

Defendants should be required to disgorge any and all benefits they received, including
any compensation, commissions, kickbacks, profits or other advantages they received as a
result of their wrongful conduct.
SEVENTH CLAIM FOR RELIEF
(Rescission of the Contract)

86.

Paragraphs 1 through 85 are hereby incorporated by reference as though fully set forth
herein.

87.

SSD agreed to the SSD/CMT Contract only because it believed and understood that CMT
was affiliated with and a part of PRP.

88.

SSD's belief and understanding regarding the nature, character and affiliation of CMT
came directly from Defendants and was reasonable.

89.

In reality, CMT was not affiliated with or a part of PRP and was not and is not even a
distinct legal entity as far as the State of Utah is concerned, in that it is not organized or
incorporated pursuant to the laws of the State of Utah or registered to do business within
the State of Utah as a foreign corporation.

90.

If SSD had known that CMT was not affiliated with or a part of PRP, or that it was not a
legitimate corporation authorized to do business within the State of Utah, SSD would not
have agreed to sell the Property to CMT.

91.

SSD's unilateral mistake of fact justifies rescission of the unperformed portions of the
SSD/CMT Contract.

92.

Defendants' fraudulent misrepresentations regarding the true nature, character and
affiliation of CMT justify rescission of the unperformed portions of the SSD/CMT
Contract.
1?

93.

Defendants' civil conspiracy to defraud SSD justifies rescission of the unperformed
portions of the SSD/CMT Contract.

94.

Defendants' commercial bribery justifies rescission of the unperformed portions of the
SSD/CMT Contract.

95.

Recission of the unperformed portions of the SSD/CMT Contract would not prejudice
CMT.

96.

Forcing SSD to fulfill the unperformed portions of the SSD/CMT Contract would
severely prejudice SSD while unjustly enriching Defendants.

97.

The SSD/CMT Contract should be rescinded.
PRAYER FOR RELIEF

WHEREFORE, SSD requests the following relief:
1.

That a money judgment be entered in favor of SSD and against Defendants jointly

and severally in the amount of $360,000;
2.

That Defendants be required to disgorge any compensation, commission, benefit,

profits, payments, kickbacks or other benefits gained as a result of their wrongful conduct.
3.

Treble Damages for Fraud.

4.

Punitive damages as determined by the Court.

5.

That SSD be awarded prejudgment interest at the statutory rate of 10% from the

date of the SSD/CMT Contract until the date of judgment, and post-judgment interest thereafter
at the statutory rate until paid in full;
6.

That the unperformed portions of the SSD/CMT Contract be rescinded;

7.

That SSD be awarded its reasonable costs and attorneys' fees incurred to

prosecute this action;
8.

That an order be entered allowing SSD to augment any judgment obtained in the

amount of reasonable costs and attorneys' fees expended to collect or enforce the judgment by
execution or otherwise as established by SSD or SSD's counsel without further notice to
Defendants;
9.

For such other and further relief deemed just and appropriate by the Court.

DATED this T ^ d a y of June 2000.
SCALLEY & READING, P.C.
Attorneys for Plaintiff

Steven B.Smith
Darwin H. Bingham

j4tft*£vi
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PURCHASE A N D D E V E L O P M E N T A G R E E M E N T

&A
" ^ / ^ ^ D e v e i ° P m e n t Agreement ("Agreement") is made and entered into this
eL day ofApril 1997 by and between PRP Development, LC ("PRP"), a Utah Limited Liability
Company Ru^l-P*kard Development, Inc. ("RPD, a California Corporation, Premier Homes
ConstrucQon, LC. ( Premier"), a Utah Corporation and Lawrence M. Russell ("Russell")
Premier Homes, LC and Premier Homes Construction, LC are two separate entities.
RECITALS
WHEREAS, Russell and Premier Homes, LC are the sole members of PRP, and
WHEREAS, Russell desires to sell all of hisright,title and interest in PRP to Premier on
the terms and conditions set forth herein, and
_ WHEREAS, Russell desires the right to acquirefromPRP Lots 1 to 72 in the Saratoga
Springs Subdivision, Phase 1 located in Utah County, Utah (said lots are hereinafter collectively
referred to the "Saratoga Property"and the individual lots are referred to as the '"Lots") pursuant
to the terms of a real estate purchase contract ("Contract") sisned by PRP on November 5,1996
and signed by CMT Investments as Seller on November 8,1996 which Contract names PRP as
Buyer, and
WHEREAS. Russell is willing to pay PRP to acquire said Property.
NOW, THEREFORE, in consideration of the covenants and promises set forth herein, the
parties mutually agree as follows:

1.

Purchase of Interest in PRP. Premier agrees to pay and Russell agrees to accept the sum
of $5,000 for Russell's remaining interest in PRP. Russell shall transfer it's interest in PRP
to Premier at the time of closing. Premier shall pay Russell the purchase price at the time
of closing. The parties represent that the purchase prices set forth herein represents a fair
estimate of the value of Russell's remaining interest in PRP as of the date hereof.
Saratoga Pmpenv PRP agrees to assign to Russell all of its right, tide and interest in the
Contract and itsrightto acquire the Saratoga Property at the time of closing. Russell
agrees to ray PRP the sum of $528,000 for PRP's interest in the Saratoga Property. Said
sum shall be paid as follows:
a.

Russell shall pay PRP the sum of 58,000 for each Lot on 66 Lots of the Saratoga
Property. In such an event, Russell shall be entitled to sell the first 6 lots without
making any payment to PRP. On the last 66 lots, Russell shall pay PRP the sum of

1

S8,000 at the time of closing of the sale of each Lot No interest shall accrue on
the unpaid balance.
b.

In the event Russell sells, assigns or transfers the Saratoga Property other than
through the sale of an individual Lot, the amounts due PRP shall become due and
payable upon such in such event.

c.

The amounts due PRP shall be secured by a standard trust deed and trust deed
note in favor of PRP to be recorded after the closing of the construction loan '
and/or an escrow arrangmcnt at American Legal Title, acceptable to PRP, which
arrangment provides for the payment of $8,000 to PRP upon the sale of each Lot.

d.

Russell shall have until April 1,1999 to pay the principal sum of S528s000 at no
interest. Interest shall accrue after April 1,1999 at the rate of S percent per annum
on the unpaid principal balance. After April 1,2000, the principal sum, together
with all accrued interest, shall become due and payable

Disclaimer of Interest. As a material part of the consideration of this Agreement, Russell
and RPI acknowledge and agree that upon the consummation of the transaction set forth
in this Agreement, neither Russell nor RPI shall have any farther interest in and to PRP or
any of its assets, projects or properties.
Notice. All demands and notices to be given hereunder, if any, shall be personally
delivered or sent by registered mail addressed to the respective parties at their postal
addresses as of the date of this Agreement or to such other address as each may hereafter
designate in writing.
Successors. Except as otherwise provided herein, this Agreement shall be binding upon
and inure to the benefit of the respective parties hereto, their legal representatives,
successors and assigns.
Entire Agreement. This Agreement constitutes the entire agreement and understanding
between the parties hereto and supersedes all prior agreements or understandings.
Amendment. This Agreement may not be altered or amended except by a subsequent
written agreement executed by all of the parties hereto.
Attonevrs fees. In the event of any controversy or claim dr dispute between the parties
hereto arising out of or relating to this Agreement or any of the documents provided for
herein, or the breach thereof, the prevailing party shall be entitled to recover from the
losing party reasonable attorneys' fees, expenses and costs, whether incurred prior to,
during or subsequent to trial including appeals.
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Additional Documents. The parties hereto agree to execute such additional documents as
may be necessary or desirable to carry out the intent of this Agreement.
Nonwaiver The failure of any parry to enforce the provisions of this Agreement shall not
constitute a waiver unless specifically stated in writing, signed by the party whose rights
are deemed waived, regardless of a party's knowledge of a breach hereunder.
Governing Law, The terms of the Agreement shall be governed by and construed in
accordance with Utah law. The parties agree that any legal proceedings relating to the
subject matter of this Agreement shall be brought exclusively in the Sta^e of Utah. The
parties represent to each other that the Agreement to bring legal proceedings exclusively
in the State of Utah will not place a serious inconvenience or be unfair or unreasonable to
any of the parties hereto. Because the State of Utah has a substantial relationship to both
the parties and this transaction, it is appropriate to select the Utah Courts to handle any
and all legal proceedings relating hereto.
Severability. If any of the terms and conditions of this Agreement shall be declared invalid
by a court, agency, commission or other tribunal or entity having jurisdiction thereof, the
application of such provisions to parties or circumstances other than those as to which it is
held invalid or unenforceable shall not be affected thereby, and each of them not so
declared invalid or unenforceable shall be valid and be enforced to the fullest extent
permitted by law and the rights and obligations of the parties shall be reasonable terms
consistent with the undertakings of the parties under this Agreement has been substituted
in place of the invalid provision.
Paragraph Headings. Paragraph headings in this Agreement are for convenience only and
shall not be deemed to modify, interpret or limit the provisions hereof.
Counterparts. This Agreement may be executed in any number of counterparts, each of
which shall be deemed an original, but all of which together shall be deemed to be one and
the same instrument.
Time of the Essence. Time is of the essence in this Agreement
Authorization. The 'individuals who have signed this Agreement represent and warrant
that they are duly authorized to execute this Agreement, in either their individual or
representative capacity as indicated, and that this Agreement is enforceable according to
its terms.
Survival. The provisions, promises, warranties, representations, and covenants set forth
herein shall survive any execution, settlement, delivery or recording of any instrument and
shall not be merged therein.

3
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18.

Legal CounseL The parties hereto have engaged the law firm of Caiman & Associates,
P.C. to prepare this Agreement. AJ1 parties acknowledge that they have been advised to
seek independent legal advice to represent their individual interests to'the extent they
deem it necessary.

19,

Costs. Eacfc of the parties shall pay their own costs and expenses incurred, or to be
inclined, in negotiating and preparing this Agreement and in closing and carrying out the
transactions contemplated by this Agreement

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the Parties have executed this Agreement on the day and year
above written.

PRP
rKf Develooment,
Develooment, LC
LC

Rnssell-PackardiJevelopment, Inc.

Premier Homes Construction, LC

: M. Russell

4
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Grantee:
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SARATOGA SPRINGS DEVELOPMENT, L.L.C.
ot
SALT J A K E CITY
CONVEY AND WARRANT to

grantor
, State of Utah hereby

SALT LAKE

.County of

CMT DEVELOPMENT, INC.

SALT LAKE CITY UTAH
TEN AND NO/TOOTHS AND OTHER GOOD AND VALUABLE CONSIDERATION-

grantee
for the sum of
— DOLLARS
County,

UTAH

the followmR described tract of land in
State of Utah-

LOTS 61,62,63,64 CONTAINED WITHIN SARATOGA SPRINGS, PLAT 4, SHEET 2, A PLANNED
UNIT DEVELOPMENT, AS SAID LOT IS IDENTIFIED IN THE PLAT OF SAID DEVELOPMENT,
RECORDED JUNE 25, 1997, AS ETNRY NO. 48291 OF PLATS, IN THE OFFICE OF THE UTAH
COUNTY RECORDER, AND AS FURTHER DEFINED AND DESCRIBED IN THE DECLARATION OF
COVENANTS, CONDITIONS AND RESTRICTIONS OF SARATOGA SPRINGS DEVELOPMENT RECORDED
FEBRUARY 19, 1997 AS ENTRY NO. 12514 IN BOOK 4195 AT PAGE 001 OF THE OFFICIAL
RECORDS, AND IN ANY SUPPLEMENTS THERETO.
TOGETHER WITH A RIGHT AND EASEMENT OF USE AND ENJOYMENT IN AND TO THE COMMON
AREAS DESCRIBED AND PROVIDED FOR IN THE SAID DECLARATION AND ANY SUPPLEMENTS
THERETO.
SUBJECT TO CURRENT GENERAL TAXES, EASEMENTS, RESTRICTIONS AND RIGHTS OF WAY
OF RECORD.

WITNESS, the hand

ot said ^rantoj

I st

, this

JULY

day of

, A D 19 97
Signed in the Presence ot

STATE OF I HAH.
County ot
On the
personall> appeared before me
the signer

da\ ot

, A.D. 19

of the within instrument, who duly acknowledged to mc that

he

executed the same

Notarv Public

M\ commission expires .

Residing in .
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STATE OF i
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(
SS:

COUNTY O F 3 t l M : UQKQ
ONTHEjirX
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XuLL

_ , 1997, PERSONALLY APPEARED
WHO BEING DULY SWORN DID SAY,
BER/MANAGER OF
^n^nXOT^CX
HE
WITHIN
AND
FOREGOING
)MH2
JTRUMENT WAS SIGNED ON BEHALF OF SAID LIMITED UABILITY COMAPANY
BY AUTHORITY OF ITS ARTICLES OR ORGANIZATION AND EACH DULY
ACKNOWLEDGED TO ME THAT SAID LIMITED LIABILITY COMPAQ EXECUTED
THE SAME

BEFORE ME_y
\CH FOR HI

NOTARY PUBLIC
RESIDING IN
MY COMMISSION EXPIRES:

s-i -ns
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Order No. 33355
Space above this line for Recorder's u<>e

Warranty Deed

CMT DEVELOPMENT, INC., CRANTOR(S)

hcicby CONVEYS AND WARRANTS TO
IUJSSELL/PACKAttD'S LAKESHORE @ SARATOGA SPRINGS, L.C., GRANTRK(S)

for the sum of ($10.00) Ten Dollars and other good and valuable considerations the following described
tract of land in Utah County, State of Utah, to-wit:

See attached Exhibit "A"
Tax ID No.
WITNESS the hand of said Grantor this July 1,1997
CMT DEVELOPMENT,, INC,

A *4*c.

.. itF~?
^Jtl*^

"•—3State of Utah

}

}ss.

County of Salt Lake
, who being
On the July 1,1997 personally appeared before me, _ C- *^lfljrg>sg—
by me duly sworn, did say, that such person(s) is/are the
TAJL&AAA*^
_ ofCMT
DEVELOPMENT, INC., a corporation, and that the within and foregoing instalment was signed in
behalf of said corporation by authority of its By-Laws or by a resolution of its board of directors and the
said
(L* ^^^V^**
acknowledged to me that the said corporation executed the

Witness my hand and official seal.

JU fcJfcttV^
Nytaiy Publi

~>~^

LORIfc-PYMM

I

dFJS&s, •WMy*HJBi)C.8WE«ftniH •
fcffih&M
SUPERIOR TITLE CO.
XA P j S If) 7053 3a U JltOH PMW CHTR fill
y&^3&
WOYAU, UT MM?
^ ^ E S / COUU. EXPIRES W W *
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LEGAL DESCRIPTION

EXHIBIT A
Order No. 33116
Lots 61,62,63 aud 64 contained within the SARATOGA SPRINGS PLAT 4,
SHEET 2, Planned Unit Development, as the same is identified in the Plat recorded
June 25,199? as Entry No. 48290 in the office of the County Recorder of Utah
County, Utah, and in the "Declaration of Covenants, Conditions, and Restriction* of
tbe SARATOGA SPRINGS SUBDIVISIONS, recorded in the office of the County
Recorder of Utah County, Utah in Book 4195, Page 1.
TOGETHER WITH arightand easement of use and enjoyment in and to the
common areas described and as provided for in said Declaration of Covenants,
Conditions and Restrictions.
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RffAT PRQFERT1V PURCHASE AGREEMENT
THIS R E A L PROPERTY PURCHASE AGREEMENT ("Agreement") is made and
entered into as of the 22>rtdl

day of/one, 2000, by and between Saratoga Springs

Development, LX,C, a Utah limited liability company (hereinafter sometimes referred to as the
"Seller"), as Seller; and Russell/Packard Development, Inc,, a California Corporation
(hereinafter sometimes referred to as The *Buyer"), as Buyer.
RECITALS:
A.

WHEREAS, Seller owns teal property in Utah Counly more particularly

described on record at the Utah County Recorder's Office as follows:
Plat 4, Sheet 2, Saratoga Springs Planned Unit Development, Lots
23,24,25,26,27,28,33,34,35, 36, 37 and 38 (the "Property").
B.

Buyer desires to purchase the Property for the purchase price and on the terms and

conditions set forth in this Agreement, and Seller is willing to sell the Property to Buyer on the
terms, provisions, and conditions contained in this Agreement,
C.

Seller previously e m ~ ^ _ ^ _ Heal Estate Purchase Contract for the Property

with C M T . , Inc, However, Seller claixhs that such contract is no longer in effect and has been
terminated by Seller because of claims, irregularities and breaches by C.M.T., Inc. and others
<

(collectively referred to as " C M l , Inc.!"), Buyer also may have claims against C.MX, Inc.
relating to the purchase of the Property. jThe alleged breaches by C M J , , Inc. have resulted in
i

Seller selling the Property for less than h reasonably would have otherwise and Buyer paying
more for the Property than it reasonably would have otherwise. It is the inieni of both Buyer and
1
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Seller i n executing this Agreement to minimize the losses occasioned b y the referenced breaches
b y dividing t h e l o s s e s equally. B u y e r and Seller d o n o t intend to deprive C.M.T., l a c . o f any

money to which it is legally entitled and acknowledge that C.MX, Inc. hasfileda Notice of
Interest with respect to the Property, Seller having taken the position thai C.MT., Inc. has no
furtherrightto the Property has deemed it appropriate to enter into this Agreement and Buyer
acknowledges that any issues relating to C.M.T., Inc., including matters relating to the Notice of
Interestfiledby C.MX, Inc., shall be resolved between the parties in accordance with the terms
of this Agreement,
NOW, THEREFORE, in consideration of the mutual covenants, promises, obligations,
and agreements set forth herein, and othdr good and valuable consideration, the receipt and
sufficiency of which are acknowledged, the parties hereto agree as follows:
1.

Property, T h e definition i f the term ^Property*7 u s e d in this Agreement, as set

forth in paragraph A o f the Recitals aboye, is by this reference incorporated herein and made a
part o f this Agreement. T h e Property shill include, without limitation, the described real
property, any improvements constructed;thetcon, and all rights and appurtenances pertaining
Thereto, and any right, title, or interest o f Seller i n and t o adjacent streets or casements, alleys,
i

rights-of-way,
2.

or a n y other rights or interests o f the Property.
purchase Price: T h e purchase price for the Property shall b e T w o Hundred Forty

Thousand Dollars ( $ 2 4 0 , 0 0 0 . 0 0 ) described as f o l l o w s :

2
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Lots 23> 24,25,26,27 and 28 shall have a total purchase price of

One Hundred Fifty Thousand Dollars ($150,000.00), or Twenty-Five Thousand
Dollars ($25,000,00) per lot
(b)

Lots 33,34, 35.36,37 and 38 shall have a total purchase price of

Ninety Thousand Dollars ($90,000.00), or Fifteen Thousand Dollars ($15,000.00)
per lot,
(c)

Each lot shall be released upon die separate payment of the amount per lot

specified.
3,

Seller's Warranties.

Seller hereby represents and warrants to Buyer for the

purpose of inducing Buyer to purchase the Property, and acknowledges that such representations
and warranties are material to Buyer's decision to purchase the Property, as of the date hereof
and as of the Closing Date as follows:
(a)

Seller has good and marketable fee simple record title to the

Property.
(b)

Seller has all legal right, power, and authority to enter into this

Agreement and to consummate x^c transactions contemplated hereby. The
execution and delivery ofihis Ain-eement by Seller and consummation by Seller
of the transactions contemplatedjhereby have been duly and validly authorized by
all necessary corporate action oil behalf of Seller. This Agreement has been duly
executed and delivered by Seller and it and all instruments and documents

3
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executed and delivered by Seller at the Closing, constitute and will constitute
legal, valid, and binding agreements of Seller, enforceable in accordance with
their respective terms.
(c)

Wardley/McLachlan Development, LX.C. is a managing member of Seller

and has the necessary authority to sign this agreement on Seller's behalf. Scott C. McLachlan is
a member of Wardley/McLachlan Development, L.L,C and has the necessary authority to sign
this agreement on Wardley/McLachlan Development, LJLC/s behalf.
(d)

There are no municipal or other governmental assessments against the

Property other than current real pibperty taxes and impact fees. Seller has not entered
into any understanding or agreement with any taxing or assessing authority with respect
to the imposition or deferment of jsny taxes or assessment relating to the Property,
(e)

In furtherance of its claim, Seller has commenced a lawsuit against

C.M.T., Inc. in the Third Judicial ^District Couit in and for Salt Lake County.
which is numbered Q009<H607Ojl (the "Action"), Seller shall hold Buyer
harmless and indemnify Buyer from any claims by C.MX, inc. against Buyer or
its principals relating to the sale qf the Property to Buyer as described herein.
Seller also agrees to the following;
(1)

Buyer will place Ten Thousand Dollars ($10,000.00) in an escrow
account with Surety Title Company each time Buyer closes with a

4
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third party on a home built on one of the lots described above, for a
total of One Hundred Twenty Thousand Dollars ($120,000.00).
(2)

The funds In the escrow account shall remain in escrow until the
Action has ^een fUlly andfinallyresolved by judgment, settlement,
or otherwise.

(3)

If Seller prevails in the Action or CM.T.f Inc obtains a judgment
against or receives a settlementfromSeller totaling less than
Ninety Thousand Dollars ($90,000,00), all of the funds in the
escrow accbunt shall be returned to Buyer within ten days after full
and final resolution of all claims,

(4)

If C.MT-, Inc. obtains a judgment against or receives a scttlem
as related to the s a l e of the Property
from Buyetf that judgment or sctdement shall be paidfromthe
funds in the escrow account. If C.M.T., lncf obtains a judgment
against or receives a settlementfromSellerforNinety Thousand
Dollars ($£o,OQQ,0G) or more, Seller will pay the first Ninety
Thousand Dollars ($90,000.00) of the judgment or sctdement and
the remaujing portion will be paidfromany funds left in the
escrow account. If there is a balance remaining in the escrow
account after all judgments are satisfied, it shall be split equally
between Buyer and Seller.
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If C-MX, Inc. obtains a judgment against or receives a settlement
from Seller in excess of Two Hundred Ten Thousand Dollars
($2IG,QOO.QO)> Seller shall be solely responsible for paying the
portion of the judgment remaining after the One Hundred Twenty
Thousand Dollars ($120,000-00) in escrow has been exhausted.

(6)

Buyer and Seller agree if one or both obtain a judgment against or
receive a settlement from C.M.T., Inc. arising out of the alleged
breaches described or referred to in the Action and the other
matters tcf&red to herein, that the net proceeds of any and all
amount <-^WT«M zfeT QQ^ m^ reasonable wonieys' fc*s
incurred in! obtaining the judgments are deducted, will be
combined and split equally between them.

(7)

Seller's anft Buyer's agreement to the above shall not be an
admission that any such funds are owed or due C-MX> Inc. and
shall not diminish the indemnity of Buyer by Seller herein nor be
considered a waiver of any sort by Buyer or Seller-

(I)

The above representations, obligations and warranties of Seller shall

survive the expiration or termination of this Agreement the discharge of any other obligatioas
owed by the parties to each other, and ttyc Closing and transfer of title to the Property to Buyer,
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and shall not be affected by any investigation by or on behalf of Buyer, or by any information
which Buyer may have or obtain with respect thereto,
4.

payer's Warranties. Buyer hereby represents and warrants to Seller for the

purpose of induciog Seller to sell the Property, and acknowledges that such representations and
warranties are material to Seller's decision to sell the Property, as of the date hereof and as of the
Closing Da*c as follows.
(a)

Buyer has all right, title and interest to the Contract for the purchase the
Property.

(b)

Buyer has all icgai<right, power, and authority to enter into this Agreement
and to consummate the transactions contemplated hereby. The execution
and delivery of thi£ Agreement by Buyer and consummation by Buyer of
the transactions contemplated hereby have been duly and validly
authorized by all qecessary corporate action on behalf of Buyer, This
Agreement has been duly executed and delivered by Buyer and it and all
instruments and documents executed and delivered by Bayer at the
Closing, constitute and will constitute legal, valid, and binding agreements
of Seller, enforceable in accordance with their respective terms.

5.

Closing and Post Closing

5,1.

Closing.

Closing 09 Buyer's purchase of the Property (hereinafter referred

to as the '"Closing") shall be held at the Offices of Surety Title Company on June^fc^, 2000 at
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pjn- or such other time and place as may be agreed to in writing by both Buyer and

Seller and shall take place simultaneously with the execution of this Agreement. Closing may be
accomplished on such date through an escrow established with the Surety Title Company, or
another escrow agent approved in writing by Seller and Buyer, The date on which the Closing
actually takes place, or if more than one day is required to complete the Closing, the date on
which the Closing is actually accomplished is herein referred to and designated as the "Closing
Date." At the Closing, the following shall occur, each action being considered a condition
precedent to the others and all being considered as taking place simultaneously, and (subject to
the terms and conditions hereof) each party covenanting to perform or cause to be performed
each such action to be performed on its pan:
(a)

Buyer shall pay to1 Seller One Hundred Fifty Thousand Dollars
($150,000.00), or Tweaty-Five Thousand Dollars ($25,000.00) per
lot,forLots 23.24,25,26,27 and 28.

(b)

Buyer shall pay tq Seller Ninety Thousand Dollars ($90,000.00), or
Fifteen ThousandiDollars ($15,000.00) per lot, for Lots 33,34,35,36,37
and 38.

(c)

Seller shall execute, acknowledge, and deliver to Buyer a Warranty
Deed, conveying and warranting to Buyer fee simpletitleto the
Property.

(d)

Seller shall deliver to Buyer possession of the Property.

8
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Seller and Buyer stall execute and deliver to each other closing

statements.
(f)

Each party shall ^t

,t acknowledge, and deliver such other

documents and instruments and take such other action as the other party or its
legal counsel may reasonably require in order to document and catty out the
transactions contemplated in this Agreement.
6.

P^nflr'q Tilk InfftirePgff

In conjunction with the Closing, Seller shall, at

Seller's cost and expense, cause the Title!Company to issue and deliver to Buyer (as the named
insured), a policy of title insurance, providing for standard coverage, in the amount of the
purchase price of the Property, insuring tjiat fee simple title to the Property is vested in Buyer,
Buyer shall pay the additional cost of any special endorsements or so-called "extended coverage"
that Buyer may desire.
7.

General Provisions

7.1

Real Estate Comqiteqionftl

Seller represents and warrants to Buyer that Seller

has engaged the services of a broker in connection with this Agreement, Seller shall be
responsible for paying the brokers fee ahd shall indemnify, save, hold harmless, and defend
Buyer from and against such claim if it is based upon any statement, representation, or agreement
alleged to have been made by Seller. Byyer represents and warrants to Seller that Buyer has
engaged no broker or finder in connection vvith this Agreement. Buyer shall be responsible for
paying any broker's or finder's fee or cdramission, other than the fee of the broker engaged by

9
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Seller sexforthabove, and shall indent*.,, -^*c, hold harmless, and defend Seller from and
against such claim if it is based upon any statement, representation, or agreement alleged to have
been made by Buyer, The provisions of this Section 7,1 shall survive the Closing or any
termination of this Agreement.
7.2

Interppflfljon. This Agreement shall be governed by and construed in accordance

with the internal laws of the State of Utah. Whenever The conrext requires, the singular shall
include the plural, the plural shall include the singular, the whole shall include any part thereof,
any general shall include both other genders, and the term "person* shall include an individual,
partnership (general or limited), corporation, limited liability company, trust, or other entity or
association, or any combination thereof. The word "including" shall be interpreted to mean
"including without limitation." The **, j *>ajcr" shall mean Buyer named herein or any
assignee of Buyer, The section headingsl contained in this Agreement are for purposes of
reference only and shall not limit, expand or otherwise affect the construction of any provisions
of this Agreement This Agreement shall bind and inure to the benefit of the parties hereto and
their respective successors and assigns. ;The provisions of this Agreement shall be construed
both as covenants and conditions in the $ame manner as though the words imposing such
covenants and conditions were u$ed in cfach separate provision hereof The exhibits referred to in
this Agreement shall be incorporated into and shall be considered a pan hereof The provisions
of this Agreement and the exhibits bereilo shall, when possible, be construed together in
determining the intent of the parties.

10

32

V

.,VJ.

JUN-22-0Q

x f c f V i

13:18

13

rA

A

oui

^o

ioio

V,KAlb ADA&bUN

FttU-SCftU LA* FIHI

Assignment-
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Neither party shall assign any right, title, and interest under this

Agreement to a third party without ibe written consent of both parties, which consent shall not be
unreasonably withheld- Notwithstanding the assignment of either party's interest hereunder,
each party shall remain primarily responsible to the other party hereto for the performance of
each and every obligation of such party under this Agreement.
7.4

Consultation with Attorney. Each party represents that such party had

opportunity to consult with legal counsel iof that party's choice concerning this Agreement prior
to execution hereof.
7.5

FflTJre Agrpflflient.

This Agreement and die documents referenced herein

contain the entire understanding of the parries hereto with tespect to the transactions
contemplated hereby. All prior representjations, negotiations, agreements, and understandings of
the parties are merged into this Agreement No change or modification to this Agreement shall
he valid unless it is in a writing signed by the party against whom enforcement is sought.
7>6

No Waiver.

Acceptance by either party of any pcrfonnancc less than required

hereby shall not be deemed to be a waiver of the rights of such party to enforce all of the terms
and conditions hereof. No waiver of any such right hereunder shall be binding unless reduced to
writing and signed by the party to be charged therewith.
7.7

Tnv^idity of yp^viaon.

If any provisions of this Agreement as applied to

any party or to any circumstance shall be adjudged by a court of competent jurisdiction to be
void or unenforceable for any reason, the same shall in no way affeci (to the maximum extent

U
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permitted by applicable law) any other provision of this Agreement, the application of any such
provision under circumstances different from those adjudicated by the courr, or the validity or
enforceability of the Agreement as a whole.
7.8

Time of the Bggence AS concerns all matters of notice and performance agreed

upon hereunder, it is covenanted by the parties that time is strictly of the essence of this
Agreement
7.9

CftnfiflenpftliP/. Buyer and Seller agree that this Agreement shall be confidential

and that neither the Agreement nor the teims hereof shall be disclosed to a third party except
with the written consent of both parties at pursuant to a valid court order.
7.10

Consolidation. Buyer and Seller will attempt to consolidate into one action any

legal claims they may bring against CMJT.* Inc. or others arising out of the alleged breaches by
CM.T>, Inc. and others.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, Seller and Buyer have executed this Agreement as of the day
and year first above written.
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S£UJER:
Saratoga Springs Development. LX.C.

;ey/Mci«chlanDevtlc-r—
;ging Member

RusseJUPickardlDevelopnjenj, toe.

r r

C. £$$_—-fca^nee M. Eussell
Its:
President

By; Qmu C. MuLmlrtftu
Member, Wardlcy/McLachlan Development, L.L.C.
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Deposition of LAWRENCE RUSSELL, taken on behalf of

1

Defendant, at the offices of DART, ADAMSON (, DONOVAN,

LAWRENCE RUSSEL
Page 4
Salt Lake City, Utah, October 30, 2001 time a.m.

2
3"?G East South Templf, Suite 400, Salt Lake City, Utah,

was duly sworn, was examined and
testified as follows:
EXAMINATION
BY MR. WANGSGARD:
Q. Could you state your name for the record.
A. Lawrence Mark Russell.
Q. Mr. Russell, have you ever had your deposition
taken before?
A. Yes.
Q. I'm going to lay out a few ground rules. If
you wait until I finish a question, I'll wait until you
answer and that way we will have a clear record for the
court reporter. If you don't understand a question,
please feel free to tell me you don't understand and
I'll rephrase it or do whatever I can so you understand
it better.
Do you have any questions before we start?
20
A. No.
21
Q. What is your address, Mr. Russell?
22
A. My residence address?
23
Q. Yes.
24
A. 2221 Hollister Terrace, Glendale, California
25 91206.

on O-tober 30, 2001, commencing at 11:00 a.m., before
DONNA M. WARD, Certified Shorthand Reporter, Registered
Professional Reporter and Notary Public in and for the
State of Utah, pursuant to Nctice.
APPEARANCES
FOR THE PLAINTIFF:

FABIAN 6 CLENDENIN
BY: SCOTT R. SABEtf, ESQ.
215 South State, Twelfth Floor
P.O. Bex 510210
S a l t Lake C i t y , UT 84151

12

16

FOR THE DEFENDANT: WILLIAM BUSTOS: POE INVESTMENTS;
NEXUS INVESTMENTS, LLC; ARISTOTLE INVESTMENTS, INC.;
BUSTOS ENTERPRISES , Ltd., AND WILLIAM A. BUSTOS F.AMILY
TRUST:
DART, ADAMSON 6 DONOVAN
BY: CRAIG J. WANGSGARD, ESQ.
370 East South Temple, Suite 400
Salt Lake City, UT 84111

17

FOR THE DEFENDANT: JOEL M. CARSON:

13

14
15

COHNE, RAPPAPORT & SEGAL
BY: KEITH W. MEADE, ESQ.
525 East First South
Fifth Floor
Salt Lake City, UT 84102

18
19
2C
21

FOR THE WITNESS:

22
23

SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU
BY: MICHAEL CARLSTON, ESQ.
10 Exchange Place, Eleventh Floor
P.O. Box 45000
Salt Lake City, UT 84145

24
25

Page 3

WITNESS

EXAMINATION BY

Larry Russell

Mr. Wangsgard
Mr. Meade

PAGE
4
51

Mr. Carlston

118

Mr. Meade

118

Mr. Wangsgard

119

Mr. Meade

120

EXHIBITS:
No. 1

Purchase and Development Agreement

No. 2

REPC and Addendum

No. 3

Plat Map

33

No. 4

Listing Contract fc Agency Disclosure

34

No. 5

Real Property Purchase Agreement

No. 6

Company History Document

8
16

40
120

LARRY RUSSELL

3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19

Page 5
Q. Do you have a Utah address?
A. I do.
Q. And what is that?
A. 368 Bay Side Drive, Saratoga Springs 84043.
Q. Do you know a gentleman named John Thomas?
A. I do.
Q. How did you meet Mr. Thomas?
A. He contacted me via telephone.
Q. When was that?
A. It would have been, as memory serves, early in
the 1990s, perhaps 1992, 1993, probably 1993, 1994.
Q. Were you in California at the time of the
telephone conversation?
A. I was.
Q. Where in California were you?
A. I was probably in my office in Fontana,
California, when he called.
Q. Do you still have an office in Fontana,
California?
A. I do not.
Q. Do you still have an office in California?
A. I do not.
Q. Do you have an office in Utah?
37
24
A. I do.
25
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2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
111
12
13
14
15
16
17
; 18
19
20
21
!22
23
124
25

Page^8]
Page 40 1
you bought them from?
1
A. What lots are you talking about?
A. Yes.
2
Q. I'm talking about the 72 town home lots. The
Q. Any other business dealings with Lynn Wardley?
3 final 12 lots that you purchased, they were directly
A. No.
4 from SSD; correct?
Q. Any other business 5
A. Yes.
A. I'm sorry, Craig, I've bought property, another
6
Q. Did you approach them to purchase the lots or
property, from Lynn Wardley, directly from Lynn Wardley,
7 did they approach you to sell the lots?
although it may be a partnership also, I don't know, but
8
A. I don't remember.
it's the Marina Village Project, and I don't know what
9
Q. Do you have any documents that might reflect to
the legal description of it is. Oh, yeah, it's Plat 4
10 help you to recall?
or Amended Plat 4, Phase III, PUD Saratoga Springs, Lots
11
A. I don't think so. It was a complicated issue
1 -- I don't know what the lot numbers are but there are
12 and I really don't recall how it came about.
approximately 33 lots that I bought from him there.
' 13
Q. Here is a document to be marked Exhibit 5.
Q. And that purchase was not from SSD?
14 (Whereupon Defendant's Exhibit No. 5 was marked
A. It might have been from SSD or it might have
15 for identification.)
been from Lynn Wardley. I don't remember.
16 BY MR. WANGSGARD:
Q. Would you have documents that would tell you
17
Q. Do you recognize this document?
who you bought it from?
18
A. I do.
A. Yes.
19
Q. To the best of your knowledge is this the
Q. Any other business dealings with Lynn Wardley
20 document that reflects the purchase of the contract to
that you know of?
21 purchase the 12 lots, the final 12 lots?
A. No.
22
A. Yes.
Q. Are there any other business dealings you may
23
Q. Do you know who prepared this document?
have had with an entity you believed to be owned by Lynn
24
A. Yes.
Wardley?
25
Q. V/ho prepared this document?
Page 41

Page 39
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
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24

A. No.
Q. Just to be clear, any business dealings with
any entity that you believed to be part owned by Lynn
Wardley?
A. Well, I don't know. You know, I bought 66 lots
in North Ogden through Joe Colosimo, who I think at the
time I purchased the lots was an agent with the Wardley
outfit. I don't know if that qualifies.
Q. No.
A. That would be the only instance that I can
think of.
Q. In the transition that's the subject of the
matter of this litigation, you ultimately bought 72 town
home lots; is that correct?
A. Yes.
Q. The final 12 lots, were they bought directly
from SSD?
MR. CARLSTON: I object to the characterization. It
assumes facts not in evidence.
BY MR. WANGSGARD:
Q. Please answer the question.
A. Yes.
Q. Prior to closing on those 12 lots, how did the
purchase from SSD come about? Did you approach them to

1
2
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A. Michael Carlston.
Q. Were you a party to the negotiations that
ultimately resulted in this document?
A. Yes.
Q. Who were those negotiations with, between you
and who else?
A. My primary contact was with Peter Staks. I did
have conversations with Lynn Wardley, but Peter Staks
carried the bulk of the load initially and then we
turned it over to our representative attorneys to
finalize it.
Q. Do you remember who their attorney was?
A. No.
Q. Who did you discuss purchase price with?
A. Well, either Lynn Wardley or Peter Staks, those
are the only two people that I had any discussion with
on this.
Q. Do you recall who you discussed the purchase
price with?
A. I do not.
Q. Do you recall the substance of your discussions
or negotiations with Lynn Wardley?
38
A. Yeah, it isn't all that earth shattering. He
called me at home one evening. He was very upset and he
caught me at a time that I was very upset because we

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
The undersigned hereby certifies that a true and correct copies of the foregoing
were mailed, postage fully prepaid, as required by Rule 26, Utah Rules of Appellate
Procedure on the n

day of February, 2003, to the following:
Michael R. Carlston
R. Brent Stephens
Heather S. White
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU
10 Exchange Place, 11th Floor
P.O. Box 45000
Salt Lake City, UT 84145
Craig G. Adamson
DART, ADAMSON & DONOVAN
370 East South Temple, Suite 400
Salt Lake City, UT 84111
George W. Pratt
Marci Rechtenbach
JONES, WALDO, HOLBROOK & MCDONOUGH
P.O. Box 45444
Salt Lake City, UT 84145-3200
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